A Draft for the PM’s Tuesday Speech

The draft of a speech seemingly prepared for the Prime Minister at her direction has been leaked (although not necessarily at her direction) to the editor.  It forces a completely new assessment of what she wishes to achieve, and a new admiration for her vision and courage, two virtues far exceeding those of her opponents in this country and in Brussels.  Her insistence on rejecting the parochial politics of Brexit for the global politics in which the restructuring of the European Union is only one part — alongside fifty million refugees and Africa’s legitimate ambitions — will place her opponents at serious disadvantage.

DRAFT Speech

The eager anticipation expressed by so many wishing to learn the details of our strategic approach to Brexit is, really, most encouraging, reflecting, as it surely does, widespread enthusiasm for the new opportunities it brings us both for expanded trade globally and, no less important, the necessary improvements in national security.  I intend today to set these opportunities out very briefly and in context.

Context is important and, I fear, the true Brexit context is easily overlooked by too many.  Brexit may appear important to Europeans, but this does not mean it will be considered so in isolation from the World.  Matters of a global importance will affect us all, eventually, much more than will Brexit.

Of these the most serious by far is the unsolved problem of the fifty or sixty million people displaced from their homes and having too many children for the resources available.  Many countries make small contributions to the alleviation of their misery, but who is producing the solution to it?  If we project the World refugee population forward for only a few years we can quickly see it to be a catastrophic trend, catastrophic for the refugees and catastrophic, too, for the remainder of the World’s steadily expanding population as it is crushed in the rush for resources.

Allied with this problem and part of it is the African continent, and this, too, is a European matter.  Millions there will join the flow, already well established, northward towards Europe.  They are coming for our technology, to learn our skills, and to return home to use them. Regrettably, once here they often prefer to stay, and their home countries stay poor.  Their passage may be blocked temporarily in Libya, if the EU pays Libya appropriately, but we have seen already how these migrants spread out around the Mediterranean to find alternative entry points, and Libya is now encumbered by a civil war between rival governments supported intermittently by rival groups of militias and criminal gangs.

No Brexit plans will make any sense at all unless the reconstruction they require of the EU recognises these two neglected problems, Asian refugees and African migrants, and caters for them while attending to the dangers of Libya following the path of Syria.  I shall return to this.

Our United Kingdom

But first What, in the context of what I have just described, is the British attitude to Brexit?  It can be summarised easily.  The United Kingdom wishes to retain its access to the Single Market, to recover control of its frontiers, and to repatriate its lawmaking, all while remaining the EU’s most loyal ally and firmest friend.

I shall repeat that.  We seek to remain the EU’s most loyal ally and firmest friend.

To demonstrate what I mean by loyal alliance and firm friendship we shall give to the EU a major asset for which its leaders yearn but cannot find a means to acquire, and as a new Global Britain we shall lead a world-wide, tariff-free trade expansion.

And for the removal of any doubt I shall answer this question.  What is this United Kingdom of which I am spokesman and which has these aims?  It is a Union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and within its boundaries there are Highlanders and Lowlanders, Yorkists and Lancastrians, Ulstermen and Cornishmen, Anglians and Brummies, Scouses and Geordies, all of whom are British and, with all their countrymen, disinclined to suffer frustration when they have decided what they want.

Any who believe the Brexit vote can be frustrated by separatist movements should examine the damage done to Scotland by extremist sentiment.  I am frequently told that Scotland voted to remain in the EU, but Scotland did not vote.  Scotland had no vote.   Scotland as a country is a physical reality, and as ancestral history it is a spiritual reality, but extended into some anthropomorphic fantasy it does not acquire the franchise.   The reality is that a majority of those Scottish residents listed on the electoral roll who went to the polls and voted did indeed express their wish to remain in the EU, but that offers no guide to the future.  The economic situation in Scotland is now in flux, and any future independence poll that I might authorise will respect the powerful sentiment of Scottish ancestry, and be extended to include, in addition to all UK residents, all who justifiably boast of pride in their Scottish traditions and their British history wherever in the World they reside.

Europe’s Mediterranean Sea

The freedom Brexit brings to the United Kingdom will open our horizons to immense opportunities and to new ways to work with the other European states for the benefit of all.  We believe in free trade, and as a leader in its promotion I foresee us working very closely with the EU on the development of the European economy.  But this is only the obvious Brexit benefit everyone can see.

The less obvious is the route to a new rationalisation of European Defence in the light of the more recent analyses of the threats and the existing dangers.  NATO will remain the principal safeguard with respect to territorial ambitions arising in the east, because it provides the structure to keep the United States as close as possible, and it ties the United Kingdom into a European alliance, but as it is unreasonable to expect the United States to fund the protection of Europe’s Mediterranean flank against migrants in the numbers currently expected, and against the millions of refugees forecast for the future, the United Kingdom will lead the new Mediterranean-based European Alliance.

The Mediterranean is a European Sea, historically controlled by the Royal Navy with the support of France and Italy, and its future control, so important in the face of the future threats we all recognise, will be based primarily on a new carrier fleet operating around the British aircraft carriers.  However, the provision of an active defence is insufficient.  The fundamental nature of the two threats we face, large numbers of impoverished and malnourished humans with small numbers among them whose intentions may deserve less sympathy, requires proactive measures.

Libya, the country through which a substantial proportion of the current flows seek to pass, is the fourth largest in Africa and has a population of less than seven million.  Its fertile littoral can be expanded southward with the nourishing waters already tapped from beneath the desert sands and available in great lakes feeding the pipes Gadaffi had the foresight to lay for his “Great Man-Made River”.   Unfortunately, the system has suffered serious damage during the Libyan conflicts, but this can be repaired and must be repaired, for here is a destination, starting with 5,000 square miles leased by the UN or the EU from a newly pacified and united Libyan government, for the many millions who could be shipped in during the coming decades.  As a secular protectorate under the care of the European Alliance, financed by oil, gas and international investment, with a credible guarantee of security, it could prosper as did Carthage, and as did the early Arab conquest when Islam spread westwards.

Libya is currently in serious trouble, and nothing is to be gained by pretending otherwise.  It threatens to follow the path blazed by Syria, yet need not do so if the UN, NATO, EU and, as the leader of the European Alliance, the UK, are willing, jointly, to impose peace with the aid of investment finance and, where necessary, maximum force.

The Libyan Protectorate

The migration northward of ambitious Africans could be controlled once this magnet was in place and functioning as a serious industrial centre, and as this would facilitate cooperation with those governments which had encouraged the emigration in search of the expertise needed at home, there would then be opportunities for an intellectual recolonisation of Africa with European direction of the investment necessary to unlock the continent’s underground riches.

The great nineteenth century expansion of British industry was based on the opportunities offered by an empire of trade and underground wealth.  This will now be repeated for the alliance of the EU, UK and the cooperating European states directing the investment flows into the Libyan Protectorate and the sub-Saharan states.  All cooperating governments will gain from this partnership.

But what I propose is, I must emphasise, based on peace and security.  In the Mediterranean this means a strong naval presence, and although some EU members can offer a few ships for specific operations, the EU itself has no naval assets and no naval command experience to impress African governments and Chinese investors.  I propose that the United Kingdom will provide these.

The two aircraft carriers being built for the Royal Navy were designed for wars quite different from those that might possibly be fought today, and are far too vulnerable to modern ballistic missiles to be risked in a serious conflict with another major power.  Moreover, the strike aircraft intended for use with them are far too short in range for use in a major war.  (Their acquisition has been, and doubtless would continue to be, more controversial than any in our history, but we need not be drawn into arguments about their capabilities other than to note that their range, about which there is no argument, is too short to be of practical use for the Royal Navy.)  Accordingly, I am instructing the Ministry of Defence to cancel these strike aircraft and to supply costings for the conversion of these two warships into Disaster-Relief Ships, assets the World has needed for many decades.  The necessary finance will be supplied from our International Aid budget.

As Disaster-Relief Ships they will carry Chinook helicopters, Osprey VTOL transport aircraft, and small Dolphin utility/liaison aircraft.  Their galleys will be capable of producing many thousands of meals per day, and a water purification plant will cater for the most common shortage in disaster scenarios.  There will be an extensive medical/surgical department with high-tech operating theatres and hundreds of beds.  One of the two ships will always be on duty in the Mediterranean, acting as the Command Centre of the screen protecting Libya, and combatting illegal immigration and piracy, while the other, when not in refit, will cruise in the tropics’ earthquake belt.

The two ships will be supplied to the EU for use by the European Alliance, with positioning crews found by the Royal Navy, on what is effectively a renewable twelve-year wet-lease.  (They will fly the EU standard at the bow and the White Ensign at the stern.)  When needed, the operational crews, whose members will be drawn from many different European countries, will be flown in from all directions to a disaster area’s nearest airports, and then will transfer to the ships by Ospreys or Chinooks.

I said that we would remain the EU’s most loyal ally and firmest friend, and that we would seek to share the opportunities our freedom would create.  These opportunities will be in Africa, which we shall help with the technology its peoples come to Europe to find, our friendship with the EU will be symbolised by the EU disaster-relief ships, and in the European Alliance partnership the UK, the EU and the independent European countries will expand tariff-free trade with the British Commonwealth countries, the North American countries, and all others seeking to advance peace and prosperity.

Editor’s comment:  

We shall not know until Tuesday whether the PM will use this draft, or whether she will use any part of it, but we hope she will at least insist that the UK will remain undivided and intent on continuing as the EU’s most loyal ally and firmest friend.  An aircraft carrier has not been a useful war weapon for many years now; the weapon is the carrier fleet, and even the US is beginning to have doubts about the viability of theirs.  The UK cannot afford to put to sea a complete and fully manned, fully armed carrier fleet, and will not in 2020 be able to protect its carriers against the known 2020 missile and submarine threats.

The draft’s comments on the Joint Strike Fighter version the UK is buying, the F-35B, are a very modest criticism.  In this blog it has been categorised as a golden turkey which cannot climb, cannot turn, cannot fight, cannot run, and cannot be afforded.  However, while all this will be denied, the PM has used only the killer argument:  the F-35B has no legs.  There can be no denial for this.  The sales brochure range figure bears no relationship to the actual performance figures the planners and pilots must use on operations at sea in adverse weather conditions and with no air-refuelling capability.        

With the wet-lease cost paid from the International Aid budget, there will be a useful contribution to the Defence budget each year, a Defence budget already boosted significantly by the cancellation of the redundant F-35B, and these supplements will help pay for the aircraft the RAF really needs. and for the personnel the Royal Navy must have to compensate for those so foolishly discarded during the recent ill-planned redundancy programmes. 

Morale must endure

The PM on Defence (3) [edited transcript]

I think we can begin by immediately following where we ended our last meeting.

If you have now read Called to Account and Bullingdon Defences you will be aware of the substantial savings available in the running costs of the MoD and in the acquisition of materiel. These will be hugely substantial savings if we are ruthless, and there are interesting possibilities in two of the more extravagant programmes: the aircraft carriers, and the F-35B JCA/JSF (alias the Lightning II).

The aircraft carriers are said to be essential if we are to remain in the “First Division”, but with current plans we have contentious issues to settle. Was it wise to build these carriers dedicated to one strike aircraft (in this case the F-35B which is yet unproven, is far over budget, is many years late, and is persuading the Pentagon’s own objective analysts that it is tactically useless)? How much would it cost to retrofit catapults and arresters if we are forced, when the F-35B fails, to choose another aircraft? Are these the carriers we need, or should we have chosen a different design? Were the full costs of a carrier fleet with its full complement of fully-armed escort vessels and supply auxiliaries counted? And how vulnerable to ballistic missiles will carriers be ten years from now? How vulnerable will they be to wide-diameter supersonic cruise missiles with high-explosive anti-tank heads on the day they sail into an area where they are unwelcome?

And if we do have such carriers, where will they operate? In the North Atlantic, of course, but the Indian Ocean will be owned by the Indians, and the China Seas will be owned by China. Almost all the Pacific is owned by the USA. And as there are cheaper ways of defending the Falkland Islands in the distant future against an aggressively oil-hungry and belligerent South American Treaty Organisation, are these new carriers necessary? Without them and their escorts there would be substantial funds to buy and operate many more far less expensive ships of the type we need to keep our vital sea lanes open, free from terrorists and pirates, and our coastlines free from illegal immigrants and drug traffickers. Michael tells me that the MoD is now looking at an inexpensive frigate, the Type 31, which will be very versatile, and if we have no carriers we may not need the very expensive Type 45 destroyers (of which we have six of the planned fourteen) — releasing a lot of money for many more ships. We have to find the answers to all these questions.

Then there is the F-35 itself. Is it needed in addition to the Typhoon? Is its seagoing variant, the F-35B, capable of operation as was intended, especially in respect of range? Is the American Lockheed Martin F-35 programme meeting its targets? Well, no, it is not, as I expect you all know already, but it appears difficult to find anyone in the MoD willing to admit that, even though it is very late, about $200 billion over the projected budget, and the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test & Evaluation doubts it will ever be ready for operations. (We know the US Marines claim that it met the requirement of their IOC, their Initial Operational Capability, but that was after redefining their IOC as an Interim Operational Capability.) The cancellation of this aircraft for the RAF would provide a substantial saving, although no one has told me how much, apparently because the MoD does not know the figure. Do you, Michael? No, and if you did it would be a different figure next week anyway. Unofficially I’ve been allowed to know that the unit cost will total, when all the extras are added to the basic cost, around £150 million. That seems an awful lot of money for one aircraft that cannot fly very far. However, I am not persuaded we shall need carriers at all after 2020, even if they are not as vulnerable as some of our advisers fear. We need more advice on this, and especially we need to know just how big a carrier’s escort fleet must be, how much that will cost, whether we have that many ships, and, if we do have the ships, do we have the sailors to man them?

Well, why pretend? We already know we don’t have sufficient sailors. Apparently, in pursuit of the bonuses paid to the civil service for “efficiency savings” – which they thought could only be achieved through reducing manpower – the MoD discharged men essential for the continuation of naval operations. Michael, you have to take action on that MoD bonus culture.

These are all matters that require detailed consideration, and although you, Michael, will be advised by the Chiefs, who will probably disagree with each other, I think it may perhaps be useful if you learn the views of a few retired officers whose relevant experience would be helpful and whose opinions will not be shaded by what they think you want to hear. The MoD has been running on tramlines. Few there have dared to think imaginatively under the previous management, so we must encourage new ideas. There really have to be cheaper ways to fight wars.

I believe that with the probable exception of aircraft carriers we must insist on the retention of all the capabilities of the UK’s Armed Forces, funded in part by ruthless surgery and strict discipline, in part by the defence budget, and in part by a third element we shall discuss later. I have mentioned critical mass. There are recognisable limits to downsizing beyond which a fighting unit or a fighting service suddenly loses its ability to fight and, crucially, its ability to train the next generation. The Armed Forces can be pushed down only so far, and then suddenly everything is lost. I am hugely impressed by what was achieved in Afghanistan with inappropriate equipment and inadequate support, as have been commentators from many other countries with whom I have discussed what might be necessary to defeat the Taliban. (For the avoidance of doubt I shall stress here that we do not consider the Taliban to have ben defeated, whatever our predecessors may have claimed.) Our Armed Forces have a core of experience and skill recognised and envied (when politicians have refrained from interference), especially in maritime reconnaissance and urban counterinsurgency, and that expertise is a marketable commodity, a saleable asset. It has been bought with British blood and treasure. It must not be lost; it can earn revenues; and it is a national asset which it is our duty to preserve.

In respect of economic issues it has become fashionable to speak of “UK plc”, but then not to follow the logic of a large company. If any commercial enterprise was in the current financial position of the British Armed Forces then its directors, after ascertaining the full extent of the problems, would examine the savings possible from reorgani­sa­tion (huge within MoD), from reductions in number (using Typhoons only, not the F-35s), from postponed investment (the Trident decision may perhaps be delayed for a few years), from replanning development (projecting power without a carrier fleet), and would certainly consider not only retrenchment, but also its alter­native, expansion — which is what we are here to examine. Expansion, my friends — how shall we fund it?

The expansion of our Armed Forces is vital to prepare for the defence both of the UK and its interests in future war, whether with the deterrence of Trident and its successors, or the projection of sea and air power in support of the Army in a major campaign such as the Falk­lands, or the suppression of insurgencies threatening our allies or our home territory. The maintenance of these abilities requires expansion of the current strength of the Armed Forces, and the Forces should then be available to do the work for which other nations can pay if and when for political reasons they cannot honour their obligations. Germany has been an obvious example, the UN is another, and so is America. When Great Britain and the Empire fought alone against the Nazis for two years, the fight was for American freedom also — and yet America charged us for its support. Now, in the Middle East, America needs us, and although the war there is necessary for our future safety also, that precedent suggests America should pay for British support (as Washington offered when it hoped to persuade Harold Wilson not to withdraw us from East of Suez). If we are to assist in the struggle to save the world from future war, the world can pay, especially those of the NATO countries whose domestic politics prevent them providing their fair share of men and materiel. In line with this policy, and in recognition of the huge contribution our Armed Forces make and will continue to make to peacemaking in underdeveloped areas, elements of the ringfenced budget for overseas development aid will be diverted to the defence budget in recognition of this.

Trident falls into this category of external financing, for although it deters a nuclear attack on British interests, its principal use since its introduction has been to keep the United Kingdom in the First Division and sat firmly on our permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. As such the deterrent is an expense for Central Government, both for the capital costs of Trident and its replacement, and also for its operational costs. The recent move of its costs into the Defence budget was financial gerrymandering, creative accountancy. However, the financial decision on the Trident replacement, as I have suggested, need not be taken immediately and would best be reserved until we know more about the American progress with the Ohio-Trident replacement.

The UK is an island nation that needs a much larger navy, and its army has shrunk below critical mass. Defence Bonds (with interest at, say, 5 per cent) may be needed to finance this essential protection, but if the nation is to survive, the money for its defence against certain war must be found, just as it was found to save the falling banks. And why not? Quantitative Easing is justly criticised when it feeds an expansion of consumer credit used to support China’s exports, but there is every reason to use it for investment in the Armed Forces. Defence can be financed directly by extra taxation and by the public’s purchase of Defence Bonds, and then be used to reboot the defence manufacturing industry, recreating many of the thousands of jobs lost by our predecessors, and accelerating a continuing surge in economic expansion. The increased capabilities of the Armed Forces will be available for export to wherever the UK’s allies and/or the UN may need support and can pay for it, thus supplementing our foreign currency earnings.

Included in these capabilities the Armed Forces can export are our training schools, traditionally greatly admired abroad but with their potential as income limited until now by the need to train our own people. We can expand them hugely because we have the skills other nations seek, and until other nations have equivalents to Dartmouth, Sandhurst and Cranwell, which most of them will never have, the market is ours. Additionally, we have economies of scale that will make our fees very attractive. We know that the spaces we do offer are much wanted, and we know also that by training the officers and future commanders of foreign forces on our equipment we open doors for our exports.

I have been shown the latest data for the power output from the windmills. The figures are disappointing and confirm the poor reports I have received from Denmark, previously the most enthusiastic advocate of wind power. When we shall need most power, in a cold winter for heating and in a hot summer for air conditioning, our weather will be shaped by anticyclones, which means that we need nuclear power stations for those windless periods. These, naturally, unlike windmills, produce what we need throughout the year. (Those responsible for the arithmetic justifying the windmills may have been those who justified some of the defence procurement catastrophes.) I have now been persuaded that we should examine whether the projected investment of so many billions in wind power might be far better diverted to investment in defence.

Si vis pacem, pare bellum. At the beginning of the 20th century the UK was not ready for the Great War of 1914-18 either intellectually or materially. (Four years before its start the War Minister rejected the idea that aircraft could play any worthwhile role in war, and Lord Kitchener rejected as unnecessary a request for the use of reconnaissance aircraft at Gallipoli, and we all know the consequences of that.) At the war’s close the UK and the Empire found we had lost 990,000 men and the undisputed world leadership we had held at its start. The lack of preparedness was repeated for the World War of 1939-45, when the UK did not have the power to curb Nazi ambitions at the critical time. (Four years before its start the Chief of the Imperial General Staff still preferred cavalry to tanks and he refused to read the writings of Fuller and Liddell Hart who predicted and advocated armoured warfare.) At the war’s close the UK had lost 450,000 men plus the greatest empire in known history. The threat from Soviet Russia that emerged soon afterwards was later neutralised by a NATO built on a platform provided by the USA, without whose faithful support an impoverished Western Europe would be under Communist rule today.

The emerging threat at the beginning of this present century is from an economically unstable world defined by the Islamist threat of jihadism, nuclear proliferation, overpopulation, struggles for resources, and an America with its power declining as the newly industrialising countries surge in population and GDP. If we now cannot learn the lessons taught by the near-past, the harsh lessons of the 20th century, and if we persist in relying on the support of unreliable European allies led by a newly enfeebled America, then we invite defeat.

The defence of the UK requires a ballistic nuclear deterrent (that is Trident, its submarines and the replacements), a navy capable of keeping the vital sea lanes clear of terrorists and pirates (with a large number of small, appropriately armed ships), and an army capable both of fighting insurgencies overseas and of training territorial soldiers in very large numbers at home. The RAF must be capable of logistic support for the forces overseas, of long-range maritime support for the Royal Navy, of Close Air Support, and of retaining an air-fighting expertise appropriate to those threats that might emerge and then perhaps be resisted. The overall ability of the Armed Forces must be increased substantially, and all the investment deferred during the last two decades must now be provided, but the waste of billions of pounds can be stopped with the application of intelligent disciplines and the expulsion from the MoD of politicised and incompetent civil servants. The nation can have what we know is essential for our defence, and it can have it at an affordable price. We cannot afford not to have it.

We are aware, and doubtless Philip will keep telling us, that we may not have all the money the Armed Forces need, but we must clarify the distinction between cutting programmes and cutting capability. The first we can afford; the second we cannot. A rough estimate suggests we ought to plan on at least five per cent of GDP for the next ten years’ investment, and to provide this, as I have said, from savings created by ruthless surgery and strict disciplines, and from the Defence budget, plus from what I described as unconventional means — from ministries such as the FCO (for the nuclear deterrent) and International Development (for peacekeeping), from other countries and organisations (such as America, the EU and the UN), from Defence Bonds, and from foreign companies seeking to invest in the UK’s famous and well-proven innovatory skills in the defence industry. Additionally, we can divert funds from other budgets such as wind power. We shall make this work because we must make it work, and to ensure the nation understands the desperate seriousness of the situation, to ensure the nation understands how my predecessor misled everyone, us included, by the manipulation of some figures and the concealment of others, I intend to include this text, these words I have said to you this afternoon, in my speech at the Party Conference.

Philip, if you have problems with your Treasury people, refer them to the growth of our GDP during the years the Luftwaffe was nightly hammering our manufacturing industry. The increase in the annual rate of growth (not just the increase in the GDP) is staggering. At the same time, in America, where industry was not troubled by air raids, the increase in the GDP rate of growth was incredible, and it laid the foundation for America’s economic strength today. Investment in our defence industries, especially at the SME end of the scale where we often appear to be unrivalled, can pull us out of the mess in which the last government has left us. It will kickstart economic growth again, as pouring money into welfare payments never will, and because of our historic international reputation in this field, Defence, it will bring in foreign investment.

But, anyway, there is no choice. The nation must understand this. Inadequate Armed Forces may constitute a viable political compromise, but they will never form a successful defence. Potemkin destroyers, and aircraft with guns that cannot fire, will certainly make our future historians smile, but they belong to the past. We must never again allow such incompetence. We must now invest for the future.

I shall conclude my Conference speech with a comment on Morale — which currently in our Armed Forces Is at its lowest-ever recorded level.  This would not normally distress the MoD, but it is reducing the chances of hitting the 30,000 target Philip set for the Reserves. There are three elements that concern me: Competence, Honesty and Morale, and of these Morale is the most important.  Field Marshal Lord Slim told us that Morale Must Endure, that of its three foundations, Spirit, Intellect and Material, the Spiritual component has primacy — but, and we all know this, the Spirit of the Armed Forces, specifically their esprit de corps, has been crushed continuously during the last twenty years or so.  (The two books I asked you to read, Called to Account and Bullingdon Defences explain how.)

I want Honesty:  it will start here in this room and drive the Conference. It will recognise that the Morale of our Armed Forces, crucial to our national security, has been crushed by the MoD’s incompetence and dishonesty as manifested by its extravagant waste of money on ill-defined, badly researched projects, its incompetent direction of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, its criminal negligence in the dereliction of its Duty of Care, and the dishonesty of its bonus culture. Fixing this may be interpreted as Michael’s job, but it is in reality the responsibility of us all — for our national security is at stake.

Morale must endure.

Thank you all.  We shall resume our discussion of Morale after Conference.

We have been unable to confirm the authenticity of this leaked text, but shall leave it online until it has been formally denied.

  called-to-account    Bullingdon Defences - cover KINDLE

 

Field Marshal Viscount Slim wrote —

Morale is a state of mind. It is that intangible force which will move a whole group of men to give their last ounce to achieve something, without counting the cost to themselves; that makes them feel they are part of something greater than themselves. If they are to feel that, their morale must, if it is to endure–and the essence of morale is that it should endure–have certain foundations. These foundations are spiritual, intellectual, and material, and that is the order of their importance. Spiritual first, because only spiritual foundations can stand real strain. Next intellectual, because men are swayed by reason as well as feeling. Material last–important, but last–because the very highest kinds of morale are often met when material conditions are lowest.

 

Heroes of Helmand

If you did not watch Heroes of Helmand recently on Channel 4, or record it, you missed one of this year’s most important reports of the mismanagement of our war in Afghanistan. It astounds all who see it, but, of more importance, it makes everyone ask questions. Fortunately, it can be downloaded from the Internet.

Easy Company, consisting of Paratroopers and Royal Irish, is shown taking over a compound from a company of Danish soldiers who, symbolically, are taking away with them equipment far superior to that the Britons replacing them have brought.

The compound looks nothing like those we’ve all seen in movies. Its walls are much too low to give the protection the men will need, and the lookout posts are so exposed they will invite sniper fire and, as you will see, men will be killed.

So your first question will almost certainly be: “Why are these guys sent here?”  But it could also have been about why they were in Helmand at all. And your next question will be about the air support the company commander needs for reports on movement in the vicinity of the compound: “Why is the sky empty?” you will ask.

If you have kept a copy handy, you will readily deduce the answers from Sir John Chilcot’s Report and his findings on the conduct of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If not, well, one word appears sufficient: Incompetence.

But there is another word Sir John refrained from using: Insouciance.

Insouciance in the MoD is owed to the unbridgeable gap between those who rule, the Senior Civil Service, and the cannon fodder they direct (memorably described by a recent MoD ‘Boss’ as “public sector workers”).

Incompetence, on the other hand, in Whitehall, is owed primarily to ignorance, and that this can have such tragic effects in battles so far away from London is owed principally to the lethal disease of perverted managerialism.

Managerialism

What’s that? Well, after a famous Frenchman, Henri Fayol, analysed the art and science of management it was decreed that an understanding of that art and science was all that managers needed for success. A detailed knowledge and understanding of what their organisation was supposed to be doing could safely be left to the lower orders.

This belief took root in Whitehall, where it was nurtured by the Senior Civil Service who quickly recognised its beneficial effects on promotion and on security of tenure, and in the Ministry of Defence its status was elevated to that of a religion. But why should this be so?

If the detailed knowledge and understanding of what the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines, the Army and the Royal Air Force did was unnecessary, then the Senior Civil Service could run the Defence of the Nation without the interference of admirals and generals. The only restriction that could offer any inconvenience would be money, but once agreement with the Treasury was reached on what was to be available, then how it would be used would be decided by those clerks sitting in the offices best furnished and enjoying the finest views of the Thames.

Now, no one can expect this to be believed, even after the defeats in Basra and Helmand, can they? Can you believe it? No? Of course you can’t. Now sit comfortably.

Let us look at the monstrous triad, the three principal decision makers in power when we were sent into Helmand. First, the man in charge of the crucial finances, the MoD’s Financial Director, had, according to Hansard, admitted to no financial qualifications. Second, the man who led policy on our military engagement in Afghanistan, the Director of Operational Policy, had, according to the MoD website, never served in the Armed Forces and had no naval, military or avian experience or qualifications. And third, the Boss . . . . . . .

Well, obviously, the Boss would compensate for the manifest inadequacies of the other two, or could hide them, for that Boss was the top Boss who ruled the MoD (and could veto whatever she didn’t like admirals, generals and air marshals doing). And her qualifications included a university degree in English literature, some time in the Justice Ministry to which she eventually returned, and several years at Work and Pensions. (She had absolutely no experience of the Armed Forces before she joined the MoD as 2nd PUS to keep a close eye on the finance, but her Pensions experience was very useful when those who were just short of their retirement date could be squeezed out more cheaply.)

And herein lies the true source of our Helmand problem. Managerialism decrees that the managers know how to manage and thus, implicitly, that they appreciate the decisions requiring knowledge and understanding must be left to the lower orders. Unfortunately, these managers, although, devoid of military, naval and avian understanding, use the authority of their high positions to take asinine decisions such as that which sent only 600 men into Helmand, a hostile province three times the size of Wales, and sent an inadequately-armed company into Musa Qala where, as the Channel 4 documentary shows you, encircling its low walls 500 well-armed Taliban waited, planning to kill them.

Another question this documentary feature will prompt you to ask will be about the men having to expose their fragile bodies in the observation posts on the roofs. Obviously, they needed to know what the enemy was doing, but why not, you will ask, use an aircraft to watch the enemy and to report its movements by radio?

That’s a fair question, and before going back into 1939 to answer it, we ought to note that all the startling information published today in today’s blog has been copied from the MoD website and MoD memoranda, and from Hansard. Additionally it may be noted that these complaints about the lack of aircraft to protect vulnerable infantry were explained in detail in the Daily Mail four years ago, and elicited no response from the MoD.

The Austers

When WWII began the British Army had no liaison aircraft suitable to work with the artillery for reconnaissance and to report fall-of-shot, so twenty light touring aircraft, two-seaters, were requisitioned. They had been made in England under licence from the American Taylorcraft company, and after modification a few went to France from where they returned in 1940 without having seen action.

They were then given more powerful engines, named the Auster Mark 1, and sent to North Africa in 1942 for Operation Torch where in action they acquitted themselves well, as they did throughout the war on every front. The Americans acquired similar liaison aircraft (they called them “grasshoppers”) from Taylorcraft, Aeronca, Piper and Stinson, and together with the Austers the allies had in service by the end of the war 15,300 of these valuable utility platforms.  Later marks of Auster continued flying after the war, but in the 1950s the Army, desperate to operate the weird helicopters then becoming available, agreed that in return for accepting this, the RAF would own all the fixed-wing aircraft.

Officially the RAF had no further need for small liaison aircraft.

auster

The Auster in World War II

‘Buddy Cover’

For the Auster this was the kiss of death, yet the troops on the ground, the men doing the actual fighting, needed those Austers. That was sixty years ago, and in Helmand today those Austers are still needed for the same reason, ‘Buddy Cover’, the liaison work that includes persistent surveillance from overhead, continuous reconnaissance of enemy position and movement, resupply of ammunition, food, water, batteries, mail, medical requirements, and emergency evacuation when medical helicopters are unavailable.

Of all these uses the most valuable in Helmand is the escort of vulnerable foot patrols and, as shown in the documentary, the bird’s eye view of what the enemy is doing – avoiding the casualties sustained in the observation posts.

The Austers are no more, but their replacement was designed for greater performance, simplicity of maintenance, and ease of operation. Additionally it was to be inexpensive to buy and to operate, and it was to be so easy to fly safely that the time needed to train pilots was less than for any other military aircraft.

dragoon-with-drone-platforms

Tandem-seated Dragoons out-perform the early Austers

The Dragoons

The MoD’s own experts at Boscombe Down, the RAF test pilots in A&AEE (the Aeroplane & Armament Experimental Establishment), had two Auster replacements, named now as Dragoons, for four months of rigorous evaluation and produced a glowing report that the clerks, finding it conflicting with their decision that “the future is rotary” (meaning that future battlefields would use only helicopters for liaison work), gave orders for the report to be suppressed.  (Suppression of the truth is not so rare as one would hope and expect.)

The aircraft’s supporters continued to press their case with, eventually, the Chief of the Defence Staff presenting to the Boss its need in Helmand, but the opposition remained firm. Although the Chief was a soldier, had commanded in Afghanistan, and had flown the aircraft, the Boss saw no need to heed his advice, nor even to visit the aircraft to look at it. And to every representation the answer remained the same: “There is no capability gap in Helmand.”

So the foot patrols continued to go out each day along routes festooned with trackside bombs, the IEDs, and into the ambushes coordinated with them, while those in compounds like Musa Qala were under fire every day from snipers and mortars, forever running low on ammunition and supplies, receiving their mail, so important to morale, only at odd intervals, and without air support to assist them materially, to reassure them that they were not forgotten, that they were not alone.

But those who’ve never served in the Armed Forces, who’ve never been in action, do not understand morale. If the MoD managers understood morale, then the MoD would not now be forced to acknowledge that the morale of the Armed Forces is lower than at any time in their history. That is official. (And it is blamed on everything and anything but the MoD itself.)

Channel 4’s documentary shows the besieged soldiers in Musa Qala running short of ammunition, and the resupply late. What is not obvious from this is that it was a common danger that had generated an Urgent Operational Requirement for a Precision Aerial Delivery System (this being one of the Dragoon capabilities). Urgent Operational Requirements (always known as “UORs”) are a priority and must be treated as such.

When this UOR remained unsatisfied for 26 months (while men were dying and, remember, it was ‘Urgent’), the Boss was asked by the Public Accounts Committee in Parliament for an explanation. If you check Hansard you will see that she replied, “I am afraid I don’t know what the precision aerial delivery system [is].”

There were, she insisted elsewhere, “no capability gaps in Helmand,” and indeed, if the UORs were ignored, then the managers in Whitehall could sleep easily.

The men in Musa Qala were betrayed, as were so many in similar bases, and so many hung out to dry on Helmand’s roads. The Daily Mail was the first journal to stress this, the BBC with The Lost Platoon, and now Channel 4 with Heroes of Helmand have followed with startling documentaries, and now it is the task of our readers to ensure through their MPs that the MoD will no longer send our men and women into action without ‘Buddy Cover’.

The A&AE trials at Boscombe Down and the Skylink trials in the US and Australia produced figures which, when applied to the Helmand casualty data from IED-ambushes, state that some 100 to 150 lives would have been saved if the foot patrols and convoys had been given ‘Buddy Cover’ Dragoons to detect newly disturbed earth and ambush formation.  Additionally, a similar number of limbs would have been saved.

We shall fight in this type of low-intensity war again, and we must prepare for it now.

The Very Close Air Support known as Buddy Cover will never be provided by the F-35B.  It must have slow-flying, quick-turning, ground-skimming Dragoons designating targets for the A-10 Warthogs.  Don’t let the politicos sell you on the F-35 JSF.  We cannot afford to buy it, and if we do buy it, then it will never be allowed to fight down in the mud.

Back from the Near-Departed

It’s been a long time, and to those who have written with good wishes my thanks and confirmation that the recuperation is proceeding more or less to plan.  A quick return to blogging has been deterred by acceptance that with all the excitement of the Referendum eclipsing everything else of political importance, the Defence of the Realm is fairly low on the SA scale, but we can now announce that the anthology of 2012 Daily Mail blogs, Bullingdon Defences, is at last available as a Kindle book on Amazon, where it will soon be accompanied by a print version.  All royalties from the Kindle version go directly to Help for Heroes to support the Flying for Freedom training of veteran amputees planning on becoming flying instructors.

The Bullingdon name used by the book’s title alludes to the  cost and nature of several of the most expensive assets procured by the MoD with the approval of the highest levels of government.  As the Forbes Blog  wrote in the Daily Mail four years ago:

“A defence posture based on the claim that our defence spend is ‘the fourth highest in the world’ has no credibility, for even if that were true it would not be a measure of our strength. The immense size of the bill for a truly smashing night out with the Bullingdon Club would not necessarily mean a man had eaten the best dinner in Oxford, would it?”

And thus a defence assumed to be good only because it costs more than can be afforded became known as a ‘Bullingdon Defence’ – ostentatiously extravagant, and one in which the greater part of the expenditure produces nothing of tangible and lasting value, while the remainder is drunkenly trashed.

The only significant change to the blog is the header, the Daily Mail name disappearing, and a Sunderland flying boat emerging from North Atlantic maritime cloud.  Is this to be considered significant?  Yes.  The Sunderland design dates from the ’thirties, it was a superbly effective aircraft, simple and rugged, inexpensive in operation and maintenance, and extremely versatile.  It was not a compromise multirole aircraft, but as it was designed and built with genius it could and did perform several roles: antisubmarine warfare (ASW), long-range maritime reconnaissance (LRMR), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Close Air Support (CAS) in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Counter Insurgency (COIN), cargo resupply, trooping, passenger evacuation, and polar exploration.

Readers of earlier posts will have recognised the relevance of that menu, and of the versatility it demonstrates, to the contrast with contemporary multirole design in which trade-offs conspire to reduce by compromise the effectiveness of each role.  The F-35 ‘Golden Turkey’ programme was intended to produce a successor to the F-16 that would succeed also the F-18, and the Harrier, and the A-10, and can now be recognised as a massive waste of money.  It is a prime example of where the multirole fallacy is bound to lead us before the men with the pursestrings can be persuaded to abandon their fantasies.

Versatility created by genius is superior to ‘multirole’ invented for marketing.

Dreams: White Elephants, Golden Turkeys

A House of Commons Select Committee report, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review, began:

“The capabilities of HM Forces should be determined not by budgetary constraints but by a fully-developed strategy which defines the position in the world that the UK wants to adopt, says the Defence Committee”

— and, oh, the joyless mirth those words triggered!

Last month the Chief of the Defence Staff delivered the CDS’s annual Christmas address to the Royal United Services Institute.  As expected, this was a fairly dull and comprehensive tour d’horizon that presented the usual Whitehall views, of course, naturally … so yes you may slumber if you wish, just print the press release, and you lot over there move along, nothing to see here …

But was it actually dull? No! It certainly was not. It was remarkably stimulating.

The CDS spoke of our post-SDSR2010 course leading to “a strategically incoherent force structure: exquisite equipment, but insufficient resources to man that equipment or to train on it”, a ‘hollow-force’.  And he spoke of our “Royal Navy as being perilously close to its critical mass in man-power terms.” Had he lost the script? Had someone fed him print-outs from this blog?

But what is this “exquisite equipment” of which he speaks?

HMS Queen Elizabeth copy

Yes, the new carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth II and HMS Prince of Wales, plus the Joint Strike Fighter (alias Joint Combat Aircraft, Lightning II, F-35B STOVL) version of the most incredible aircraft programme in history, described in combination as ‘Carrier-Strike’, are his new “exquisite equipment” – a phrase certain to enter the quotation dictionaries. To independent analysts, freed from the subjectivity enforced by MoD or Defence Industry contracts, these fantasies are respectively the MoD’s ‘White Elephants’ and ‘Golden Turkeys’.

The Royal Navy, the CDS fears, will not have the trained manpower to keep the carriers at sea, nor the jolly jack tars to man the escort ships needed to protect them from such future threats as surface-skimming hypersonic cruise missiles fired in salvoes and arriving simultaneously from different directions. (And the MoD doesn’t really have the money to buy them without subsidies from other ministries, for the original target of £3.8 billion has grown to an acknowledged £7.2 billion and is approaching the eight to ten billion pounds this blog first forecast.)

If, as we believe he must have done, the First Sea Lord has already explained to the CDS that by the time the two carriers are ready to put to sea, they will be too vulnerable to risk in a war zone, he may be wondering what on earth his successors will do with them — which may be one reason he is thinking of asking other government ministries to help fund the cost of Defence. The Department for International Development (DfID) is an obvious candidate for this privilege because it has buckets of money it is desperate to spend in order to meet the Prime Minister’s target of donating seven billion pounds every year, a target annually adjusted upwards.

Those readers who remember the Bird and Fortune discussion of the carriers mentioned here last week will doubtless have recognised the solution already. Their flight decks, it was claimed, were big enough to hold 49 tennis courts, the hangars could shelter 12 Olympic-size swimming pools. These are big ships already capable of producing thousands of meals every day, and with hospitals that can be extended into the hangar space to treat many hundreds of sick and injured. The galleys also may be extended to provide thousands of meals for helicopter transport to stricken areas.

So the Royal Navy will have two dedicated disaster relief ships ready to help the victims of tsunamis, droughts, famines, earthquakes, and civil wars.  They may carry a few V-22 Osprey transport helicopters, a squadron of Chinook utility helicopters, and large numbers of Dragoon utility scout aircraft. And when the UN finds it necessary, they can deploy quick-reaction peacekeeping forces. supply logistic support, and provide a headquarters linked to the world’s capitals.

When not leased to the UN for specific disaster relief operations, their acquisition and their training activities would be funded by DfID from the ring-fenced 0.7 per cent of the UK’s GDP, an arrangement that will secure the continuance of an important segment of our naval expertise while also retaining in service many valuable men and women soon to be threatened with redundancy.

JSF F-35B copy

In addition to the vulnerability of the carriers to the newly developed anti-ship cruise missiles, there is the problem of the carriers’ inability to mount with their planned F-35B fleet an effective Combat Air Patrol (CAP) to protect themselves from air attack.  Among the factors contributing to this are the number of Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) aboard, their range, the lack onboard of Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft (and, no, altitude-restricted helicopters are not an alternative), the range of enemy air-launched anti-ship missiles, and the number of sorties each serviceable F-35B can fly each day (currently predicted to be one every two days – although, surely, this will be improved before the aircraft are bought, won’t it?)

Of course, the phrase “planned F-35B fleet” is hedged with uncertainty because no one really knows what the plan is now or will be in 2015. There was early talk of “at least” 72 JSFs when we did not yet know if they would be the ‘jump-jet’ F-35B or the much longer range F-35C that needed the carriers to have catapults and arrester wires. Then the F-35B was chosen, and then a little later the F-35C was chosen – and then after that it was back to the F-35B with the change justified in a paper prepared, it was reported, in one afternoon. The numbers were fluctuating in parallel, with talk of two carriers with 6 JSFs each, or one carrier with 12 JSFs and the other carrier in mothballs. All fantasy, of course.

Sending a carrier to sea to fight a war with 12 strike aircraft had to be a joke, obviously, hadn’t it? No, it wasn’t a joke. Eventually someone in Whitehall heard the laughter and the provisional decision (or speculation), to be confirmed in 2015, was that there would be 36 JSFs for one carrier, and these could be transferred to the second carrier later, if that was ever completed. Now these 36 JSFs, all of the F-35B version, were projected by the analysts, on the available serviceability and regeneration data, as necessary for the carrier’s CAP, so where were the aircraft for the Government’s promised ‘Carrier-Strike’ capability? The Royal Navy and its incredibly expensive ‘Fifth Generation’ JSFs would be able to attack targets a short distance away from the carrier, or the aircraft would attempt to protect the carrier from such high-flying Mach 2 aircraft as the ‘Fourth Generation’ Su-35s before they launched their missiles, but they would not attack any targets.

Yet what targets could the F-35B attack? The munitions in the bomb bay are ‘smart’ – actually very clever – but they are not very powerful. Yes, but this is not important, a Westminster expert explained, because the F-35B is a successor to the Harrier and thus will be used for close air support (CAS) in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations where the Rules of Engagement (RoE) restrict the lethality of our weaponry – ah! that’s alright then!

So ‘Carrier-Strike’ will become CAS? There will be many among this blog’s readers who belong to an older generation that remembers pictures of the RAF’s fighter-bombers flying at low level, and very low level, to destroy trains and road convoys in what was then called ‘ground attack’ — and when these aircraft flew similarly to support the troops in direct contact with the enemy, that was CAS. But as a consequence of the never-ending war between the US Army and the US Air Force (more on this later, perhaps next month), CAS has been redefined.

B-52 copy

A B-52 dropping its bombs to “support” troops in contact with an enemy six miles below will have its action described as CAS for that reason alone. On such basis, the F-35B JSFs flying “CAS” will not be where British ‘Tommies’ and American ‘grunts’ want them, down in the mud, in touch, working with them from an austere strip — oh, no! At £125,000,000plus each they will be kept very high above anything an insurgent might fire at them.

What about the RAF then? The answer to this has been kept very vague, and what has been suggested makes no sense at all, unless ……. Unless what? Well, back in the decade following the Great War the Air Ministry had many different ideas about the bombers we might need (when the men there were dreaming about the fighters which were much more exciting), and thinking about range seems not to have been considered of great importance. If a bomber could reach the military installations and dockyards of northern France, that would be good enough. If we pierce the smoke and mirrors obfuscating the F-35B range data it appears that Brussels may have replaced northern France as the possible target. Is this important? No, of course not, it’s just a sad joke to make a point more memorable, but the MoD is describing the RAF’s use of the F-35B as ‘Deep Strike’ and that is not a joke. It is dishonest, and it repeats a traditional failing that the threatened privatisation of procurement and acquisition will not eliminate. This was explained in this blog a month ago and may be worth rereading.

So how do we assess the ‘Golden Turkey’? For the Royal Navy it is being bought at an unaffordable and still unknown price to arm the ‘White Elephants’ for ‘Carrier-Strike’ — for which it has neither the range nor, as a fighter (owing to performance limitations well known seven years ago) the ability to survive combat against potential enemy aircraft already in service. Implicit in ‘Carrier-Strike’ is the need for the carrier to survive, but the F-35B on currently projected performance and in planned numbers cannot operate an effective CAP. For the RAF the F-35B range performance prohibits any form of ‘Deep Strike’ that requires the aircraft to return to friendly territory.

None of this will be good news for those in the MoD who have disregarded their duty to keep the Defence Secretary fully briefed on the facts. (Nothing in this blog is ever Secret or above; it is all readily accessible in Washington, if not in officers’ messes in the UK.) And doubtless some adverse comments will be posted. (One of our colleagues writing elsewhere was recently assailed for having accepted the anti-JSF views widely published in American Defence papers, but we don’t just accept — we look at the JSF data published in Washington by the DoD (US Department of Defence) and the GAO (Congress’s Government Accountability Office), and then we do the maths. It’s that simple.)

All the factors briefly raised here deserve greater exposition, and that will appear here in future months, but it is now perhaps worthwhile to touch on what the F-35B would cost us up-front (a figure that will double during its 30-year life).

Remember there are three versions of the JSF — the F-35A ordered by the USAF, the F-35C ordered by both the USN and the USMC, and the F-35B ordered by the USMC only (and the British, of course). The F-35A is the cheapest version and its supposed price tends to be quote airily as if it were a generic price, so that when this is claimed to be $85,000,000 for a single F-35A there is left the impression that the other aircraft will be around that but perhaps a little more.

Obviously, a smart politician will ask if the $85,000,000 includes the engine (it does not) and all the other extras an aircraft needs to fly (it does not). That may then encourage him to ask if the $85million is accurate anyway (and it is not). He will be told that it may be more right now, but that the price is decreasing “with the learning curve” (and it is not). Of course, the way in which the costs have been structured allows full use of smoke and mirrors. Example? Right, here is one of many. The early spreadsheets included figures for maintenance labour costs through the years and decades of production, and with these was included a speculative annual percentage increase – a guess, obviously, when trying to predict figures over a quarter-century. Now watch closely. Take this guess and reduce it by, say, 0.1 per cent, and the predicted unit cost of the aircraft will decrease. Wow! So you see Senator, Secretary, General, Admiral, the price is coming down, just as we predicted the learning curve will affect it.

As we have said before, it is no use asking the Defence Secretary how much these ‘Golden Turkeys’ will cost us. He does not know. There may be someone in Lockheed Martin who knows, but he will keep it secret. We on this blog certainly do not know the exact figure, but we are able to assemble the DoD and GAO reports and read with them the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR), and examine the data available to the general public, and to the British MoD, and we can say with a fair degree of certainty that these ‘jump-jet’ replacements for the Harriers that were planned to cost us perhaps £75million each will not cost us less than £125 million each. (This blog will publish the American calculations of the figures next month.)

This £125,000,000 ‘Golden Turkey’ is one element of the CDS’s “exquisite equipment.” Who believes we can afford it?

Bullingdon Defences

Last year we published a series of six articles describing how the British Ministry of Defence had wasted billions of pounds on defence projects – with the intention that we might persuade readers to consider whether an organisation capable of such monstrous errors of judgement could be trusted to continue controlling the nation’s security.

These six parts have now been republished, together with others, in an anthology which will soon be available as a Kindle book on Amazon.  For the present a PDF version (with its web links inactive) is available for download from here.

All our revenues from the sale of the book, whether by donation from those who download the PDF file or as the purchase price on the Amazon website, will go to Help for Heroes to support the wounded soldiers, now training as pilots on the Flying for Freedom (F4F) programme, who will be using their new skills in specially modified Dragoons on next December’s Antarctic Expedition.

So what are Bullingdon Defences? 

The Strategic Defence & Security Review, the SDSR of 2010 (now known also as the Suicidal Defeat and Surrender Retreat), which, being composed together with a Spending Review was subordinated to that Spending Review, expected the United Kingdom economy happily “to continue with the fourth largest military defence budget in the world.” Since then this boast of “fourth largest” has been repeated by Cabinet Ministers ad nauseam, as if it actually means something of significance, fantasising that it would be interpreted by the electors as evidence of the United Kingdom’s continuing military strength. It wasn’t, it isn’t, and it won’t be.

The consequence of this was that in February this year the Prime Minister could pronounce in an article for The Scotsman: “We’re safer, because in an increasingly dangerous world we have the fourth-largest defence budget on the planet, superb armed forces and anti-terrorist and security capabilities that stretch across the globe.” There is little doubt that he really believes this, for he shows no understanding of military matters and relies on what the Ministry of Defence tells him, but there is monumental danger in this belief, because he, following his two predecessors, is confidently and brazenly stripping us naked before our enemies.

In response the Forbes blog wrote: “A defence posture based on the claim that our defence spend is ‘the fourth highest in the world’ has no credibility, for even if that were true it would not be a measure of our strength. The immense size of the bill for a smashing night out with the Bullingdon Club would not necessarily mean a man had eaten the best dinner in Oxford, would it?

And thus a national defence assumed to be good only because it costs more than can be afforded became known as a ‘Bullingdon Defence’ – ostentatiously extravagant, and one in which the greater part of the expenditure produces nothing of true and lasting value, while the remainder is drunkenly trashed.

To download the PDF file click on this link Bullingdon Defences

“Crude and Bonkers” Armchair Generals?

Although this blog’s colleagues are not “crude and bonkers”, “financially illiterate” armchair generals, but rather air force and navy pilots, warship and aircraft designers, and financial analysts, they have understood his message.  The Secretary of State for Defence does not wish to have their advice.

Accordingly, this blog will not today attempt to advise him, but will instead pose some questions on subjects of concern, these being [1] the new aircraft carriers, [2] the aircraft the Defence Secretary wishes to operate from them, and [3] the coordinated IED-ambush tactic expected to remain for both ground troops and civilian populations the principal threat in insurgencies.  Readers may wish to forward some of the questions to their MPs.

2 future carriers

HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales

1.   What is the Defence Secretary’s assessment of the vulnerability of the new carriers if they are deployed in hostile waters.  Have the dangers posed by the weapons listed here been evaluated?

(a)   Supersonic (and soon hypersonic) anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) with semi-armour-piercing high-explosive (SAPHE) or large diameter high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warheads.

(b)   Short and medium-range anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM).

(c)   Torpedoes.  (As the Defence Secretary may have been advised, the carriers appear to have no side protective systems.)

(d)   Mines.  (The carriers appear to be designed with a simple inner bottom giving almost no protection to under-keel threats.)

2.   What tests were completed on the carriers’ Rolled Homogeneous Armour (RHA) plate ability to defeat the kinetic energy of a supersonic ASCM (similar to that of an 11 inch to 14 inch shell)?  These tests would have been completed long before the Defence Secretary took office, but was he shown the results?

3.   What confidence does the Defence Secretary have in the carriers’ protection against HEAT warheads, bearing in mind the HEAT penetration of RHA by 3 to 6 times its own diameter?  (A single HEAT hit could be catastrophic and he will remember how HMS Hood exploded despite the pre-war warnings about the lethality of the kriegsmarine’s biggest guns.)

4.   Although everyone recognises the ASTER 15/30 capability against incoming missiles, what is its performance against crossing targets such as the missiles aimed at the carrier the Type 45 Destroyer is there to defend?  (The Probability of Kill (Pk) against incoming missiles is said to be around 0.97, which if true is very good indeed, but against crossing targets the accusation of a suicidal 0.15 Pk appears not yet to have been refuted with contrary data.)  What is the truth?

5.   In the decisions to minimise crew size in our warships (“efficiency savings”?), what allowances were made for the need to replace battle-damaged equipment with humans when the action begins?  (All-singing-all-dancing computerised machinery is financially economic and very sexy, but when hits are taken our warships need hands, which is why they are so-called.) We have noted political boasts of the intimidating size of the carriers (although around only half the size of the latest US carriers) and we have been asked if, in view of the tactical impotence of their aircraft, we shall exploit their size by ramming enemy coastlines (preferably, it has been suggested, with Captain Blair in the crow’s-nest and Captain Brown as the figurehead).

F-35B Vertical Landing

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) ‘jump-jet’ F-35B

1.   What is the Defence Secretary’s assessment of the F-35B’s vulnerability in combat?  As its weight problems have reduced its performance, and the solution to the recently discovered bulkhead cracks may lead to further weight increases, have the ‘g’ limits been reduced again?  Specifically, what for this allegedly ‘fifth generation’ fighter are the ‘g’ limits compared with those of the ‘fourth generation’ Russian Su-35 available for sale to other countries?

2.   What are the top speed and service ceiling of the F-35B in comparison with the top speed and service ceiling of the Su-35?  Yes, scary, isn’t it?  And the third element in the fighter pilot’s holy trinity is … ?

3.   Range!  Range is the third element.  (The first edition of the Joint Operational Requirements Document – the JORD – asked for the F-35B a combat radius of 464 nautical miles, but the associated data were so imprecise that USN representatives in the Pentagon thought it should be reduced to 386 nm – which they believed achievable.)  What has the Defence Secretary been told is the combat radius of the Royal Navy’s F-35B when flown by squadron pilots (not manufacturer’s test pilots) on a high-low-high profile with 15 minutes over the target and a return to the carrier with adequate fuel reserves?

4.   In defence of the purchase of the F-35B it has been suggested that what is good enough for the United States Marine Corps ought to be good enough for the Royal Navy.  Has the Defence Secretary been informed that the USMC has exchanged some of its ordered jump-jets for the longer range F-35C carrier version of the JSF, that when operating the F-35Bs it will eventually buy, the carrier will provide ‘buddy refuelling’ to extend their combat radius and to reduce the amount of reserve fuel the Royal Navy F-35Bs must save, and that the intended USMC and RN operations are too dissimilar to be compared?

5.   Has the Defence Secretary been briefed that –

(a)   – when flown in “stealth” mode the F-35B’s bombs cannot be heavier than 500lbs (insufficient to destroy, for example, a standard target such as a typical railway bridge)?

(b)   – current problems with the “stealth” anti-radar coating restrict the JSFs to one flight in two days?  (“Stealth” is the successor to the ‘swing-wing’ or ‘variable geometry’ aircraft as a concept of value only to the manufacturers – not to the operators.)

(c)    – the proposed complement of 12 F-35Bs per carrier is insufficient to operate a combat air patrol (CAP) to defend the carrier from ASCM-carrying attack aircraft, leaving no aircraft available for the strike missions (‘Carrier Strike’) for which this absurdly expensive combination has been assembled?

(d)   – no one in the MoD knows what the F-35B operation will cost the UK, and neither does anyone at the Pentagon, and nor does anyone at Lockheed Martin?  (How, then, can the famous ‘black hole’ have been filled, when no one knows the figures?)

(e)   – who advised the Defence Secretary that ‘Deep Strike’ (or ‘Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability’) would be possible with the F-35B?  (See this blog dated September 24th.)  If the carrier stands so far off-shore it has a fair chance of not being hit by shore-based ASCMs, will its aircraft (if the CAP is abandoned) have the range to reach a target and return to the carrier?  And if the F-35Bs are launched as strike aircraft from the carrier, will they survive air-to-air combat with a ‘fourth generation’ aircraft?  (The answer to that, of course, is probably not, and if they meet a ‘fifth generation’ fighter they will have no chance at all, having neither escape speed, nor height, nor agility — and the vaunted “stealth”, if it truly exists, is neither all-aspect nor all-wavelength.)

Well, that is enough for starters.  These questions are intended to publicise the reality that a group of independent and objective designers and fighter pilots (not “crude and bonkers”, “financially illiterate” armchair generals) have recognised that the carriers and the F-35B aircraft chosen to operate from them are too vulnerable to give ‘Carrier Strike’ any credibility. The Secretary of State for Defence will have heard the common claim that the magnificent electronics (computers and sensors) of the F-35B will allow the pilots to know exactly where and when they will die but, of course, this will only be after all the lines of computer code have been written, and that is many years away – which he may not have been told.  The priority question he must now ask is about the SAPHE and HEAT tests against the carriers’ armour, the RHA.

Taylorcraft Auster Mk1

‘Buddy Cover’ for troops facing IED-ambush threats

More than half the British casualties in Helmand arose from IEDs and/or sniper fire which could have been deterred or detected or destroyed before the troops were hit.  Against such threats the US Army in Vietnam used small military aircraft ( SMAs) such as the  O-1 to accompany, at low level, foot patrols and road convoys.  The British did the same in post-colonial conflicts, in Korea and in WWII, with British Austers and American Pipers and Stinsons.  However, despite a long campaign to persuade the MoD to provide ‘Buddy Cover’ with SMAs (and to protect perimeters such as that at Camp Bastion, successfully penetrated later by the Taliban), this low-cost, economic defence was consistently rejected for demonstrably fatuous reasons.

1.   Why were the recommendations presented by the MoD’s own professional experts, the Boscombe Down test pilots, for the use of the Dragoon SMAs in the role of the earlier and now obsolescent Austers rejected and their evaluation report suppressed?

2.   Why were the proposals presented by the MoD’s own professional experts, the Advanced Research & Assessment Group (ARAG) analysts rejected without any trials.

3.   Why was the request for Dragoon SMAs made by the recently retired Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) vetoed by a Permanent Under Secretary who could not understand the principles involved and who was unqualified for her job as the head of the MoD?

4.   How many lives, limbs and senses were lost in IED-sniper coordinated ambushes that if not initially deterred would have been detected and destroyed by SMAs?  How much will the damage to mental health arising from these ambushes cost the UK?

5.   Why are the Afghan Forces being left without simple and economic air assets capable of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), resupply, casualty evacuation, ‘Buddy Cover’, perimeter patrol and border patrol, despite the ARAG proposals presented consistently since 2007?

Obviously, these questions would not have been asked if we had not known the answers, but this blog asks them anyway because there is some doubt about whether the Secretary of State for Defence appreciates the importance of the questions and  has been briefed on the answers.

Postscript dated 25 October 2013

The MoD has today said of the penetration of Camp Bastion’s perimeter defences, the two US Marines then killed in action, and the loss of six Harriers destroyed and two seriously damaged, that –

“Following the incident we contributed fully to a number of US and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reviews as well as carrying out our own thorough investigations.  These processes were undertaken to assure the force protection of ISAF personnel and equipment and to prevent a similar attack happening again.

“As such, the UK’s consideration of the US review was primarily focused on whether any new material had been brought to light that would warrant additional UK action. We have now considered the US review findings in detail and are confident that we have identified all significant lessons and acted upon them.  Consequently, we are content with our earlier assessment that no further UK action is required.

ARAG consistently emphasised the danger to Camp Bastion and Kandahar perimeters from 2007 and recommended, in line with the Boscombe Down evaluation report, the economic use of Dragoon SMAs by day and night.  What, we wonder, has the MoD done with the ARAG papers?  What does the MoD intend to do with those papers now they have been validated?  How thorough are “thoroughinvestigations in the MoD?

COMMENT

An American colleague writing in a private email today has contributed this –

Basically an ASCM warhead attacking the British carriers will have to penetrate multiple decks or bulkheads in order either  to mass detonate stored ammo or to cause the hull to sink or capsize.  So the question is not just the RHA but the array of decks and bulkheads. The flight and hangar decks have to be about 30mm and 20mm respectively in thickness in order to withstand aircraft wheel loads when landing or parked. This is not armor.  Most decks/bulkheads will be 7-10mm.  It requires about 30mm of steel to defeat most fragments.  It requires about 325mm of steel to defeat a SAPHE warhead on a missile at Mach 2 plus.  It requires about 1,400mm of conventional steel to defeat a first generation ASCM’s HEAT warhead …. and double that for the current state of the art design.  Obviously, on the battlefield modern tanks use advanced armor which is more effective then steel.  Relative to the required weight per square metre these are perhaps 3-7 times as effective as steel …. but this is against darts or smaller diameter HEAT warheads.  I do not believe anyone has studied defeating big warheads.  As a matter of fact, the US can no longer manufacture ballistic steel armor thicker then about 100mm.  My guess is that the British carriers will have fragment protection, but not ballistic protection designed to defeat penetrating warheads.  (By the way, the issue for the ASTER 30 is not just Pk against crossing targets …. but a very limited engagement envelope owed to the limited kinematics of the missile.)

 

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